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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
During this term the Tenth Circuit considered cases involv-
ing procedural aspects of administrative law,' the court's scope of
review of agency decisions,2 and the interpretation and applica-
tion of several state and federal statutes.1 The most significant
decision in the area of administrative law and procedure was
Nickol v. United States,' in which the circuit held that when a
district court reviews an agency determination for substantial
evidence, and there is no conflict in the evidence, a motion for
summary judgment may not be granted. This decision is dis-
cussed more extensively below because the Tenth Circuit is the
first federal court to apply this rule.
Excepting the decision reached in Nickol, administrative law
and procedure questions were resolved by the Tenth Circuit in
accord with other federal courts and generally no striking addi-
tions to the law have been made. In United States v. Smith5 the
court followed both*Tenth Circuit' and Supreme Court7 precedent
in upholding the use of information obtained through an adminis-
trative summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service, in good
faith and prior to recommendation for criminal prosecution,' as
Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1974); Fisher v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 484 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Smith, 484 F.2d 8
(10th Cir. 1973); Spencer v. Seamans, Civil No. 72-1509 (10th Cir., filed Dec. 7, 1973).
2 Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974); Amoco Prod. Co. v. FPC,
491 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1973); Angel v. Butz, 487 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 967 (1974).
Baldridge v. Hadley, 491 F.2d 859 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974);
United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1973); Preux v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 484 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
4 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).
1 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973). Smith, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7205 (1970), filed a
withholding exemption certificate with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) claiming ten
exemptions, then immediately informed the IRS that he was entitled to only two exemp-
tions. The IRS, utilizing an administrative summons, initiated an investigation which
resulted in the criminal prosecution of Smith for supplying his employer with a false or
fradulent withholding certificate.
'United States v. Richardson, 469 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 1972).
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). The Supreme Court in Donaldson
distinguished as dictum the statement in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), that
administrative summonses may not be issued for the purpose of obtaining evidence for
criminal prosecution, on the basis that the authority for that statement-Boren v. Tucker,
239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956)-dealt with pending criminal charges or investigations solely
for criminal prosecution.
I These are the standards for use in criminal prosecution of information obtained by
administrative summons. The court nevertheless stressed that the judiciary should dis-
courage the gathering of evidence for criminal prosecution by means of administrative
summonses. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The Tenth Circuit
also followed established precedent' in Spencer v. Seamans' in
affirming the district court's refusal to overturn an administra-
tive order having substantial support in the record.
The court conventionally disposed of federal procedure ques-
tions arising in the context of administrative law. In Fisher v.
Civil Service Commission" the court applied the rule"2 followed
by the Second'3 and the Fifth 4 Circuits that when a party at-
tempts to invoke federal jurisdiction and his constitutional claim
is returned to the state court upon the federal court's abstention,
the federal court will not rehear any claims which have been fully,
freely, and without reservation litigated in state court. Following
an Eighth Circuit decision on similar facts,'" the Tenth Circuit
held in Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States'" that in a suit
originally involving claims for injunctive and restitutionary relief,
it is unnecessary on remand for a three-judge court'" to hear the
claim for money damages if the claim for injunctive relief has
been mooted.'8
I Vigil v. Post Office Dep't, 406 F.2d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 1969); Bishop v. McKee, 400
F.2d 87, 88 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 385 U.S. 57
(1966); United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963); Municipal Distrib.
Group v. FPC, 467 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
," Civil No. 72-1509 (10th Cir., filed Dec. 7, 1973). Spencer pleaded guilty to a charge
of aggravated assault, but denied allegations that the assault involved homosexual con-
duct. He was subsequently administratively removed from his civil service position with
the U.S. Air Force. Both the conviction of aggravated assault and Spencer's alleged
homosexual conduct were cited as reasons for his removal; however, upon review the
Secretary of the Air Force sustained the removal solely on the basis of the aggravated
assault. Claiming that his administrative hearing was tainted by references to his alleged
homosexuality, the petitioner appealed to the district court which upheld his removal on
the grounds that conviction of assault was sufficient to support the administrative finding.
484 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1973).
" This rule was first enunciated in England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964) and was cited in Fisher as controlling.
3 Lecci v. Cohn, 493 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 444 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1971); Rankin v. Florida,
418 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1969).
11 Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971).
'e 490 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1974).
The applicable statutes are 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1970), giving federal district courts
power over any civil action to enjoin an ICC order; id. § 2325 (1970), requiring a determi-
nation by a three-judge district court (under section 2284) before the granting of an
injunction to restrain the enforcement of an ICC order; and id. § 2284 (1970), setting forth
the procedure for and composition of the three-judge court.
For further discussion of the requirement of a three-judge court, see the discussion of
Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1974), which appears in the Federal Practice
and Procedure section infra.
1s The court determined that when a motor carrier's rate increase was cancelled by
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In two cases in which the scope of the court's review of agency
action was considered, the court applied the usual rules concern-
ing review of adjudication and of rulemaking. In Amoco Produc-
tion Co. v. FPC, 10 the Tenth Circuit interpreted an FPC opinion
2'
which had, inter alia, established rate adjustments for substan-
tial off-lease gathering of natural gas.2 Under the authority of the
Natural Gas Act,23 the Commission had revised previous mini-
mum and maximum rates for wellhead gas sales and for gas sales
made after substantial off-lease gathering. 2' Opinion 586 specifi-
cally provided that parties bound by contract prices below the
upwardly-revised minimum prices could apply for rate increases.
Phillips, a substantial off-lease gatherer, had applied for and re-
ceived a rate increase. Amoco, from which Phillips made well-
head purchases of gas under a previously existing contract, then
filed for rate increases in its wellhead sales to Phillips. Observing
that Opinion 586 had established a maximum substantial off-
lease gathering charge, 5 Amoco asserted that Phillips' rate in-
crease obligated Phillips to pay to Amoco that total price minus
the gathering charge, despite the fact that the Amoco-Phillips
contract specified a lower wellhead sale price. The FPC rejected
the ICC and then superseded by other valid rate increases, the only remaining claim by
shippers for allegedly excessive interim rates collected under the cancelled rate increase
were claims for money damages and therefore need only be heard by one-judge rather than
a three-judge court. Pursuant to the ICC's cancellation of the rate increase, the motor
carriers sought to enjoin the cancellation and were granted a temporary restraining order
by a three-judge district court. The district court then remanded to the ICC, which
affirmed its cancellation on the grounds that the motor carriers had failed to sustain their
burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the rate increases. The shippers appealed
directly to the Supreme Court which dismissed the case as moot and the motor carriers
then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which did not deal with the shipper's restitutionary
claim. The shippers filed another appeal to the Supreme Court and a protective appeal
in the Tenth Circuit, which the circuit court undertook upon the Supreme Court's dis-
missal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. Holding that the judgement of the three-judge
court was final and thus appealable, the Tenth Circuit remanded to a one-judge district
court the claim for money damages, to be determined on the basis of the reasonableness
of the superseded rate increase while it was in effect.
" The third case which considers scope of review is Nickol v. United States, discussed
below, in which the court formulates and applies a new rule.
491 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1973).
" 44 FPC 761 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Opinion 586].
" Substantial off-lease gathering is the off-lease transportation of gas together with
the compression, treatment, and liquid hydrocarbon extraction incident thereto. The
substantial off-lease gatherer is, in fact, a middleman.
n 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1970).
U Rates set in this proceeding were applicable in the Hugoton-Anadarko area only.
See Opinion 586.
The charge was 2.5c per McF.
1975
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Amoco's request, holding that Opinion 586 did not require such
a result because the gathering charge did not constitute a maxi-
mum price differential between the wellhead rate and the resale
price after substantial off-lease gathering." The Tenth Circuit
sustained the FPC's action, noting the propriety of its deference
to the agency's expertise. 2 The court reviewed the entire rate
scheme set forth in Opinion 586 and construed the scheme as
requiring computation of maximum prices after off-lease gather-
ing by adding the gathering allowance to the maximum wellhead
sale rate rather than to the actual wellhead contract price. 8 Other
issues considered by the court were resolved in accordance with
the agency's decision .
2
In Angel v. Butz,30 the Tenth Circuit followed a discernible
trend of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court3' and other circuits3 12
in its interpretation of section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 3 However, it became the first court to apply that
n 491 F.2d at 918.
" Id. at 920.
nId. at 921.
" Amoco's second argument, that denial of the increase was a violation of the Natural
Gas Act, which requires all rates to be "just and reasonable" (15 U.S.C. § 717c), was
dismissed because Amoco had no standing to litigate the reasonableness of contract rates
between Phillips and its buyer.
The court also considered the question of the proper criteria for the FPC's determina-
tion of a fair rate of return. Following the lead of the Ninth Circuit in its interpretation
of Opinion 586 in In re Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Case, 466 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1972),
the court supported generalized area rate ceilings irrespective of the efficiency of opera-
tions of individual companies. The position stressed by the court, that area ratemaking
need not guarantee a fixed profit to a specific company on a particular cost basis, is in
line with decisions in other circuits which have considered the issue. See In re Hugoton-
Anadarko Area Rate Case, 466 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1972); Southern La. Rate Case v. FPC,
428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970); Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC, 305
F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 916 (1963). This position stressed by the
Tenth Circuit also followed the logic of Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 424 F.2d 411 (10th
Cir. 1969), which held that, concerning an individual company, the FPC did not err in
basing gas price rates on the company's cost of services. The controlling case on this point
is Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), which held that the FPC need
not guarantee an individual company a fixed rate of return on its cost basis.
- 487 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 967 (1974).
" Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (where there is substantial evidence
supporting the reasonableness of a legislative action, courts will not invalidate that action
on the basis of alleged improper motive for the legislation).
" Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965); Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1965). Both cases held that when rulemaking is not on the record the Secretary is not
limited to the formally presented evidence, but can rely on his own expertise and investi-
gative results.
" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
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interpretation to administrative rulemaking.3 ' Under section 706,
a court reviewing an administrative action must set aside such
action if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law." The
Secretary of Agriculture is empowered, under the Sugar Act of
1948, to set wages annually for sugar beet workers. 36 Claiming
that the Secretary's refusal to consider the workers' demands for
improved labor conditions was arbitrary, capricious, and an
abuse of discretion, the workers sought a judgment declaring the
wage regulations to be invalid. The district court denied the
workers' claim and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.3 7 The Secretary
stated that he believed the Sugar Act did not authorize him to
entertain such labor demands and that he thought the demands
impractical and undesirable. Assuming without holding that the
Secretary's statement of his own authority was improper, the
Tenth Circuit held that the agency ruling must nevertheless
stand if there were some basis in fact for the Secretary's finding
that the demands were impractical and undesirable.3 Holding
that in the exercise of rulemaking power, an agency's action for
an improper reason will not necessarily be struck down if there
are also proper reasons for the action, the court determined that
the Secretary's finding that the demands were impractical and
undesirable constituted such proper reason for his action .
3
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Baldridge v. Hadley, 491 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Baldridge v. Hadley, ,0 a case of first impression, the Tenth
Circuit limited the government's remedies for violations of the
Cropland Adjustment Program" and regulations promulgated
The application of the section to administrative rulemaking is consistent with the
reasoning of Atwood's Transport Lines, Inc. v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 168, aff'd, 373
U.S. 377 (1962), which held that rules and regulations promulgated by government estab-
lishments pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law and are subject
to the same tests as statutes.
s 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
" 7 U.S.C. § 1131(c)(1) (1970). In so doing, the Secretary is required to make an
investigation and to give notice and opportunity for public hearing before making a deter-
mination whether rates are reasonable. The statute does not require rulemaking to be on
the record; however, the hearing is not an adversary proceeding and is supplemented by
further investigation by the Secretary.
37 487 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1973).
a Id. at 262.
a Id.
- 491 F.2d 859 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2608 (1974).
,1 Food and Agricultural Act of 1965, 7 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970).
1975
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thereunder. 2 Baldridge had engaged in a land transfer scheme
which resulted in his collection of sums of money under the Pro-
gram far in excess of the maximum sum permitted by the regula-
tion.43 The government proceeded against Baldridge under the
applicable administrative regulations, which provide that if the
Secretary of Agriculture determines that a producer has substan-
tially violated the contract, all contract rights will terminate and
payments will forfeit to the government with interest." Baldridge
appealed this decision to the district court, whereupon the Gov-
ernment counterclaimed for double damages under the False
Claims Act.15 The district court denied the double damages, rea-
soning that since the Government had elected to proceed admin-
istratively there could be no supplemental remedy under the
False Claims Act. The Tenth Circuit upheld this ruling, compar-
ing the available statutory remedies to the mutually exclusive
common law remedies of recision and damages. Having elected
to pursue the administrative remedy analogous to recision," the
Government was foreclosed from also claiming the alternative
remedy of damages.'7
B. United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1973)
In United States v. Ray,"5 the Tenth Circuit rejected defen-
dant's constitutional claims regarding an administrative sanc-
tion. William Ray was convicted for failure to tag abandoned
dead fowl as required under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act" and
regulations promulgated thereunder 0 On appeal, Ray claimed
that the wording of the regulation 5l indicated that failure to tag
was unlawful only if the bird was left in the custody of another
person. The court rejected this argument, adopting the Seventh
Circuit's approach to construction of administrative regula-
tions:5 2 the court, as in construing statutes, should look first to the
"2 7 C.F.R. §§ 751.101 to .142 (Supp. 1974).
43 21 Fed. Reg. 6296, 8793 (1956) indicates that the total amount payable annually
to any one participant shall not exceed $5000.
" 491 F.2d at 862, citing 21 Fed. Reg. 6297 (1956).
0 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) provides that any person not in the United States military
making a false or fraudulent claim against the United States shall pay a fine plus double
the amount of the Government's actual damages.
, 491 F.2d at 866.
, See note 45 supra.
' 488 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1973).
'5 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1970).
5 50 C.F.R. § 10.36 (1970).
31 Id.
12 488 F.2d at 18, citing Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969).
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language, and if the language is clear then no further interpreta-
tion is required. The language of the regulation, the court found,
was clear and certain.
53
Ray further claimed that the regulation violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment because it did not require that
there be specific criminal intent. The court adopted a rule ap-
plied by the Eighth Circuit relating to the requirement of specific
intent and applied it to administrative regulation: where the
standard imposed by the statute is reasonable and is normally
followed, where the penalty is minor, where conviction is not
stigmatizing, and where the crime is not a common law offense,
specific intent need not be proven as an element of the crime.5'
C. Seneca Nursing Home v. Kansas State Board of Social
Welfare, 490 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Seneca Nursing Home v. Kansas State Board of Social
Welfare,5 the court construed a state statute" as requiring pro-
mulgation of the Social Services staff manual. 7 The statute re-
quired promulgation of "every statement of general policy and
every interpretation of a statute specifically adopted by an
agency to govern its enforcement of administration of legisla-
tion. ' 58 The district court held that because the staff manual
contained agency rules and regulations, promulgation was re-
quired under the statute. The Tenth Circuit affirmed59 and in
doing so became the first federal appellate court to construe a
state statute of this nature. Although relief was granted on the
basis of state law, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction because plaintiff's state claims were pen-
dent to at least two federal claims. 0
D. Preux v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 484 F.2d
396 (10th Cir. 1973)
In Preux v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,"' the
Tenth Circuit interpreted a provision of the Aliens and National-
488 F.2d at 18.
M 488 F.2d at 19, citing Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960).
490 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 72 (1974).
SKAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-415(4) (1973).
'7 490 F.2d at 1326.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-416, -421 (1973).
490 F.2d 1324.
" Id. at 1327-29.
5' 484 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1973).
1975
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ity Act"2 which provides a waiver of deportation of aliens who
have procured entry into the United States by fraud or misrepre-
sentation. 3 Deportation proceedings were instituted against
Monique Preux, who had entered the United States, given birth
to a child, returned to her native Belgium, and then reentered the
United States with a visitor's visa. Upon its expiration, she
claimed the right to remain in the United States under the Aliens
and Nationality Act because her child was a United States citi-
zen." Preux claimed that because she had a concealed intent not
to leave the country upon the expiration of the visa, its procure-
ment constituted fraud and misrepresentation within section
1251(f) of the Act. The court rejected this argument. Following
similar interpretations of this provision by the Ninth65 and Sev-
enth6 Circuits, the Tenth Circuit ruled that for section 1251(f) to
apply, the fraud asserted must be relevant to the charge for which
deportation is sought and is not established by mere misrepresen-
tation in obtaining the visa. 7 Thus, waiver of deportation is avail-
able only if the charge results directly from the misrepresen-
tation.
Lynne M. Ford
II. THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974)
INTRODUCTION
The federal rule of civil procedure which permits a trial court
12 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
a 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) provides that
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within
the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of
entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other
documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresen-
tation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry
who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
" 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970). 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) provides that
the following shall be citizens of the United States at birth:
(1) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof ....
1 484 F.2d at 397, citing Cabuco-Flores v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 477
F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1973).
" 484 F.2d at 397, citing Milande v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 484 F.2d
744 (7th Cir. 1973).
484 F.2d at 397, citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214
(1966).
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to grant a motion for summary judgment' is designed to effec-
tuate prompt disposition of actions in which there are no genuine
issues as to material facts.' Courts have often considered whether
this summary disposition of a case may be utilized by a district
court reviewing an administrative decision for substantial evi-
dence3 and have consistently found the procedure to be a proper
one.' However, in Nickol v. United States' the Tenth Circuit
limited the granting of a motion for summary judgment in an
administrative review. Where the issue before the district court
is whether or not the administrative determination is supported
by substantial evidence, and "there is 'substantial controversy' as
to the 'material facts,' the district court is precluded from enter-
ing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 type of 'summary judgment.' ""
Because a motion for summary judgment may only be
granted if there are no genuine issues as to material facts,7 this
holding may appear to be obvious and unnecessary. However, it
is the opinion of several authorities8 that whether there is sub-
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 permits either party to move for summary judgment upon all or
part of a claim:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
2 Pyle, An Appraisal of Summary Judgment Practice Under Rule 56 Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 31 Miss. L.J. 147, 1-3 (1960).
' The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of an administrative
decision "except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). The reviewing
court is compelled to set aside agency actions which are found to be "unsupported by
substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute .... Id. § 706(2)(E).
' Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972);
White v. Udall, 404 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1968); Henrikson v. Udall, 350 F.2d 949 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 940 (1966); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.
1964); Adams v. United States, 318 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1963); Todaro v. Pederson, 205 F.
Supp. 612 (N.D. Ohio 1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 377 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891
(1962); Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. m. 1960); Midwest Farmers,
Inc. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 91 (D. Minn. 1945).
501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1391. A week after this decision was filed, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its
holding in Heber Valley Milk Co. v. Butz, 503 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1974). On review of a
milk order of the Secretary of Agriculture, the district court granted the Secretary's
motion for summary judgment. Because there was a substantial controversy as to the
material facts, under the authority of the Nickol decision, the Tenth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case for further proceedings. See text accompanying notes 20-22 infra.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See note 1 supra.
Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l Bank, 484 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
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stantial evidence to support the administrative decision is only a
question of law. Thus, there can be no issue of fact before the
reviewing court, and, therefore, so long as the movant is entitled
to judgment in his favor, summary judgment is proper. The
theory behind the Tenth Circuit holding is that the resolution of
the sufficiency of the evidence issue involves a review of the facts,
and if they are in controversy, then a "finding" and identification
of facts by the district court is required. Thus, the facts being in
issue, summary judgment is improper.
I. Nickol v. United States
W. G. Nickol and his wife filed a placer mining claim for
building and stone materials' which was denied by the adminis-
trative law judge on the ground that no valuable mineral deposit
had been discovered. 0 Under the authority of the Administrative
Procedure Act," the Nickols appealed this adverse decision to the
district court for a determination of whether the agency decision
was supported by substantial evidence. 2 The court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment, and the Nickols
appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision
to the lower court.
Recognizing that some cases do hold that review for substan-
tial evidence is "only a question of law,"' 3 the court nevertheless
emphasized that the very purpose of review is "to examine the
94 S. Ct. 1609 (1974); Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
859 (1972); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964); Fields v. Hannegan, 162
F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Multiple Use, Inc. v. Morton, 353 F. Supp. 184 (D. Ariz. 1972);
Todaro v. Pederson, 205 F. Supp. 612 (N.D. Ohio 1961), a/I'd, 305 F.2d 377 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254 (N.D.
111. 1960); Midwest Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 91 (D. Minn. 1945); 6 J.
MooRE, MooE's FEDERAnL PRACTICE 56.17[3] (2d ed. 1974).
1 The claim was filed under the authority of the organic statute of the Department
of the Interior which provides: "Any person authorized to enter lands under the mining
laws of the United States may enter lands that are chiefly valuable for building stone
under the provisions of the law in relation to placer mineral claims." 30 U.S.C. § 161
(1970).
10 Brief for Appellant at 2, Nickol v. United States, No. 74-1011, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th
Cir. 1974).
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-76 (1970). See note 3 supra.
* The organic statute of the Department of the Interior requires that hearings and
appeals be conducted according to the rules of the Department. 30 U.S.C. § 613(c) (1970).
The regulations of the Board of Land Appeals, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Depart-
ment of the Interior provide that hearings are to be recorded verbatim. 43 C.F.R. § 4.23
(1973). Since a hearing on the record is required, section 554 and, consequently, sections
556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act are applicable. Thus, under section
706(2)(E) of the Act, the agency decision may be reviewed for substantial evidence. 5
U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557, 706 (1970). See note 3 supra.
11 See cases cited note 8 supra.
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facts in the record."'" The court distinguished the cases cited to
it on the grounds that there were no conflicts as to the facts or
that the appellate court had reviewed the record on its own. 5 In
Nickol the facts were divergent and controverted, and thus, in
order to provide meaningful review, the Tenth Circuit held it
essential that the appellate court know how the lower court had
reached its determination, that is, what were the operative facts
to which the law was applied.'" A review of the record leading to
a de novo determination, the court stated, is improper for an
appellate court to perform but without any reasoning from the
district court, the circuit court would be obliged to undertake just
such a review.' 7 Therefore, the district court, in reviewing the
administrative record, under the statutory scheme, must evalu-
ate the testimony, resolve the conflicts, and examine the facts as
if the matter were "tried" in that court.'8
Although the court advanced scant support for its ruling,"
the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the Nickol holding in Heber Valley
Milk Co. v. Butz. 21 While no further foundation was provided, the
court more clearly articulated its position that
" 501 F.2d at 1390.
" Id. at 1391. Of the Ninth Circuit cases considered by the court, in one there were
no conflicts as to the facts. Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964). In the
others the Ninth Circuit made its own review of the record and found summary judgment
proper. Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859 (1972);
White v. Udall, 404 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1968); Henrikson v. Udall, 350 F.2d 949 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966).
11 501 F.2d at 1391.
17 Id.
I d.
" The court cites Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
rev'g 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir.), aft'g 309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) for the proposi-
tion that the reviewing court must engage in a substantial inquiry as to the facts. 501 F.2d
at 1391. In the Overton Park case the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's affirma-
tion of the lower court's granting of the motion for summary judgment by the Secretary
of Transportation. Although this particular agency action was not subject to the substan-
tial evidence test, the Court stated, nevertheless, that section 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act requires the court to engage in substantial inquiry. 401 U.S. at 415. It
should be noted here that the Nickols also appealed the agency decision on the ground
that it was "clearly erroneous as a matter of law," which is within the ambit of section
706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 501 F.2d at 1390. Although neither the
district nor the circuit court discussed this issue, the Overton Park case would also require
that a searching and careful inquiry be made to determine whether agency action is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See 401 U.S. at 416. The Tenth Circuit also quotes C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 99 at 443 (1970) to support the theory that there can be no
broad rule as to when summary judgment is appropriate. 501 F.2d at 1392.
" 503 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1974). See note 6 supra.
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it is the duty of the trial court to examine the record as made before
the administrative agency, and then to "find," and to identify, the
"facts" which it deems to be supportive of the agency's order, if such
be the trial court's resolution of the matter."
A mere showing that the judge considered the record and con-
cluded that there was evidence to support the agency decision is
not enough; the trial court itself must make a finding and identi-
fication of facts.
22
The decisions in both cases hold that summary judgment is
improper in those situations where there is a conflict as to the
facts. Yet, the court in Nickol indicated that the granting of a
motion for summary judgment would be appropriate in those
cases where, assuming the movant is entitled to judgment,21 there
I1 ld. at 97.
I ld. One of the Nickols' assertions on appeal was that the district court did not
examine the administrative record because it had been officially sealed. Brief for Appel-
lant at 2, Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974). The government count-
ered that argument by noting that both parties had, in the lower court, made numerous
references to the transcript and that government counsel found the record "taped in an
envelope, not 'sealed.'" Brief for Appellees at 4, n.1, Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d
1389 (10th Cir. 1974). In the Nickol case the court made no finding as to whether or not
the record was, in fact, examined. It noted, however, in the Heber Valley case that: "In
the present case, unlike Nickol, there is nothing in the record before us to indicate that
the trial judge before granting summary judgment had himself examined the record
.... " 503 F.2d at 98. Thus, even in those situations where the court has examined the
record, that court must find and identify the supporting facts.
0 To be entitled to judgment, the movant, if he is seeking the affirmation of the
agency decision, must establish that there is substantial evidence to support the decision.
If the movant is seeking the reversal of the agency determination, he must show that it is
unsupported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined as "more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938). See also NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 206 U.S. 292 (1939).
The Supreme Court has held that the power of review by the district court is limited if
there is substantial evidence, such evidence being adequate for a reasonable mind to
accept as supporting a conclusion. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607,
618-21 (1965). Lower courts have followed this standard to varying degrees. See, e.g.,
Henrikson v. Udall, 350 F.2d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966);
Lewes Dairy, Inc. v. Freeman, 401 F.2d 308, 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929
(1969); Consolidated Royal Chemical Corp. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1951);
Standard Distribs., Inc. v. FTC, 211 F.2d 7, 12 (2d Cir. 1954). The Tenth Circuit has held
that "[t]he court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency concerning which
of various rational but opposed inferences should be drawn from this evidence." Hyatt v.
United States, 276 F.2d 308, 312 (10th Cir. 1960). If the decision is supported on the record,
no purpose is served by reviewing in detail the evidence before the administrative agency.
More recently, the court has stated that findings of fact are not to be disturbed by the
reviewing court if there is substantial evidence to support them. Travis v. Richardson, 434
F.2d 225, 227 (10th Cir. 1970). See also Jones v. Finch, 416 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1969);
Gardner v. Bishop, 362 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1966). The result is that even if evidence is
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are no conflicts. 4
II. IMPLICATION OF THE DECISION
The Nickol and Heber Valley decisions have not increased
the power and function of the district court as the appellees have
contended." Instead, the power of the court to grant a summary
judgment motion in specific cases has been limited in an attempt
to assure the appellate court that there will be a delineation of
the district court's reasoning.
Whether or not the district court's review for substantial
evidence is a matter of law26 is not an issue. The very purpose of
such review is to examine the facts in the record." In those cases
where the findings of the agency are to be accepted, the court is
not relieved of its duty to examine the evidence to ascertain the
existence of substantial evidence." When there is a significant
controversy in the evidence there is a "genuine issue as to a mate-
rial fact," and, therefore, the court may not grant a motion for
summary judgment.21 Otherwise, the possibility increases that
conflicting, there may easily be sufficient evidence to support the decision, and the district
court, therefore, must affirm.
U "Thus if there are no conflicts, there is no problem presented. ... 501 F.2d at
1391.
The lack of discussion by the court on this point raises a serious question. The
Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) states
that section 706 (of the Administrative Procedure Act) requires that court to engage in a
substantial inquiry:
Even though there is no de novo review in this case and the Secretary's
approval of the route of 1-40 does not have ultimately to meet the
substantial-evidence test, the generally applicable standards of § 706 require
the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry. Certainly, the Secre-
tary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. But that presump-
tion is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, indepth review.
401 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit cites Overton Park, also a summary judgment case, to support its
requirement for an inquiry into the facts when evidence is controverted. See note 19 supra.
The strong language of the Supreme Court, however, may imply that that same type of
inquiry is mandatory in all section 706 review, and therefore, under no circumstances can
a district court grant a motion for summary judgment when it is conducting any section
706 review.
2 Appellee's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2,
Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).
2' See note 8 supra.
21 Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1974).
n Foote Bros. Gear & Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 802, 803-04 (7th Cir. 1941).
" FED. R. Ctv. P. 56(c). For cases which similarly interpret this rule, see Elgin, J. &
E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945); Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S.
620 (1944); Bank of Commerce v. City Nat'l Bank, 484 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1973); Brother-
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the guaranteed right of review30 may be denied. In the Heber
Valley case such a situation arose; the court noted that there was
no indication that the trial judge had, in fact, even examined the
record.3'
Since the Tenth Circuit nowhere states that summary judg-
ment is inappropriate in all cases, it is necessary for the attorney
appealing an administrative decision to find genuine conflicts in
the facts and to bring them to the attention of the court in order
to insure that the right to review is not terminated by summary
judgment. Once portions of the transcript are cited by the parties,
the court is under a duty to review them.2 Thus, if divergent and
controverted facts and testimony are indicated to the court, the
appellant has guaranteed for himself an initial review of the re-
cord, culminating in an identification of those facts which either
support or contradict the agency decision, and thereby providing
the circuit court with a record for it to review. In that situation
the district court is prohibited from granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment for either party.
Moreover, under the authority of Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v. Volpe, 13 since a summary judgment motion may not
be granted when a party raises questions of arbitrariness, abuse
of discretion, and errors of law on appeal,34 if the appellant raises
such questions, summary judgment cannot foreclose his right to
review. .
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit in the Nickol and Heber Valley cases has
made no new sweeping changes in the law. It has articulated a
rule which has long needed enunciation. As the court indicated,
"[t]he opinion does not refer to the scope of review by the dis-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Louisville & N.R.R., 211 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Ala. 1962); Poss
v. Christenberry, 179 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Miller v. United States, 54 F.R.D.
471 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See also United States v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 287 F.2d 601 (10th
Cir. 1961) in which summary judgment was held improper where there was a good faith
dispute as to the intent of the parties.
3* OKC Corp. v. FTC, 455 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1972); Harvey v. Udall, 384 F.2d 883
(10th Cir. 1967); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975
(1967); Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966); Adams v. Witmer, 271
F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958).
31 503 F.2d at 97. See also note 22 supra.
" "In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party . 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
- 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
" See notes 19 & 24 supra.
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trict courts."" They must only ascertain what is the substantial
evidence and make a record in order that the circuit court can
then provide normal appellate review. As a result of this ruling
the district court is forced to deny a motion for summary judg-
ment in those cases where there is a good faith controversy as to
the facts, and the parties are assured proper review in the district
and circuit courts.
Judith D. Levine
On Petition for Rehearing, Nickol v. United States, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974).

